Lt Gen (Retd) Mohammad Mahfuzur Rahman, PhD

Former Principal Staff Officer, Armed Forces Division, Prime Minister’s Office. mahfuzba2172@gmail.com

Current Dynamics of Myanmar Civil War:

The offensive operations of ‘The Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BA) namely; Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army in October 2023 presumably with the consent of China gave impetus to all Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO) including Peoples Defense Army (Armed Wing of Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD led National Unity Government). The simultaneous attacks all over the country overwhelmed the Junta’s capacity to cope especially in land battles. The moral component of TATMADAW (MN Armed Forces) took a serious toll i.e. huge defections, surrendering to EAOs without much resistance. TATMADAW’s reinforcement capability to threatened sectors was in short supply. Initiatives to recruit young people in the military did not produce much result.

The only option remained to TATMADAW was to resort to air attacks and the use of artillery fires from time to time on EAOs and their sympathizers. Under these circumstances, almost 60% of the territory is now under the control of EAOs. On 09 October, Kachin Independence Army captured Pinlebu a major city in Sagaing Region. In August Lashio, the capital of Shan State and Northeast Command lost to MNDAA. TNLA has continued its offensive in Northern Shan State and last month seized another strategic township Hsipaw. The overall situation reveals that EAOs are inching forward and converging on Central Command in Mandalay. This will seriously threaten the authority of TATMADAW and its legitimacy as the ruling establishment. AA making major inroads against Junta in Rakhine State to capture Western Command. However, TATMADAW reportedly, taking the newly formed Rohingya militia along has been able to stop AA advance in and around Maungdaw (Rohingya stronghold and important strategic township in Rakhine). This has caused further unhappiness in AA on Rohingyas in Rakhine. Though TATMADAW is struggling with the moral component of fighting power, the conceptual and physical components remain far from capitulation. Junta still holds the centre, hub of administration, and government machinery, the military-industrial complex and production hub, seaports, and airports.

The Economic Dynamics:

In the last three years (after the coup in 2021) Myanmar’s foreign trade though shrunk yet it has been around $ 105 billion of which $ 27 billion is in border trade. There are 17 border trade stations with five neighboring countries; China-5, Thailand-7, India-2, Banglaesh-2, and Laos-1. The daily trade volume with China through border stations is $ 10 million and with Thailand approximately $ 14 million whereas with Bangladesh, it is $ 35 thousand only. Out of these 17 border trade stations, 6 stations are under the control of EAOs, from which they have bagged $ 10 billion in the last three years. There is a war economy flourishing whereby all parties involved are benefitted politically and economically from fighting rather than winning or losing. They are financed by outside support, from loot and pillage, from drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and human trafficking all of which depend on violence to generate revenue to sustain violence. So, what we are observing is a predatory social condition. These illicit economic activities have been affecting China’s Yunnan Province seriously. Thus China is interested in authorized business activities in bordering areas. So, in the case of border trade Junta and EAOs have gone for profit sharing to maintain the status quo. This is a fragile arrangement susceptible to collapsing, potentially reviving the illicit economy. MNDAA, TNLA, and KIA get a benefit of $ 10 million in business a day. Karen National Army also gets benefits of $ 14 million a day whereas, AA in Bangladesh border only gets $ 35 thousand. So the incentive through border trade is not incentivizing for relation-building with Bangladesh rather illicit business (during trafficking, arms smuggling etc.) are more lucrative for AA.

China Factor:

China would like to see a stable Myanmar or a balance of power between the Junta and EAOs so that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects can go on and China’s interests are preserved in Myanmar. The other issue is border trade should be picked up through a profit-sharing system between the Junta and resistance forces. This effort is likely to reduce illicit business along the China-Myanmar border. China’s Yunnan province and its citizens were affected by such illegal business. The Junta was not paying attention to this concern of China in the China-bordering region of Myanmar. As such 3BA was encouraged to launch operation 1027. Following that China brokered a peace initiative between the Junta and 3BA and a cease-fire was reached in the beginning of 2024. There were a few rounds of talks but no concrete agreement on border trade and no normalcy has been reached.

After the coup in 2021 in Myanmar, China sort of distanced away from the Junta and it surfaced clearly when China approved 3BA operations against Junta around Northern Shan State and Kachin State bordering China. However, the recent visit of China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Naypyidaw on August 11, 2024, and inviting the Junta Chief to Beijing looks like giving much-desired legitimacy to the regime by China. Furthermore, the source reveals that Chinese Premier Li Qiang is likely to give an audience to Min Aung Hlaing and two sides would discuss Myanmar’s forthcoming election of 2025. This indicates there is a policy shift in Beijing regarding Myanmar. During Wang Yi’s visit, the Junta requested China to withdraw supporting EAOs, and the regime assured protection of China’s interest in Myanmar.

Meanwhile, China special envoy for Myanmar, Deng Xijun expressed his concern about the EAOs West connection especially with the National Unity Government (NUG) including its armed group. In his meeting with top leaders of Wa State Army (the most powerful Armed Group in the Northern part of Myanmar reins an autonomous government in Wa State), he claimed, “The Myanmar Military is the founder of Myanmar State and the most important political force in Myanmar’s political structure. Whether it’s NUG or NLD; they cannot replace the Myanmar Military’s position in Myanmar’s political arena”. He added capture of Lashio by MNDAA has destabilized the situation in the north of Myanmar allowing an opportunity for the US-led West to interfere.

Meanwhile, China has punished MNDAA and TNLA by cutting off supplies and much-needed logistics. China also warned Wa State not to support these EAOs, with this signal Junta has stepped up bombing at Lashio.

The West Factor:

The Indo-Pacific, Quad, and AUKUS are part of China’s containment strategy by the West. However, they have been greatly nullified by the BRI, Pakistan-China Economic Corridor, and Myanmar-China Economic Corridor. The Rohingya crisis, the coup of Myanmar in 2021 has given the US scope to be involved in Myanmar with the Burma Act that would isolate the Junta, impose sanctions, support pro-democratic force, and finally provide technical/non-lethal assistance to EAOs to dismiss Junta. Thereby curtailing China’s influence in Myanmar. There is a Rohingya Act around the corner by the US that might be contesting China’s influence in the Rohingya issue encompassing the Bay of Bengal. Very recently Mizoram Chief Minister’s comment about having a Christian country in the tri-border region (India-Bangladesh-Myanmar) indicated the West-led missionaries’ long-term plan to create a buffer state between China and Myanmar.

India Factor:

India despite being a democracy was supporting the Junta and collaborating primarily for three reasons; (a) Myanmar is a part of India’s look East and Act East strategy. India has strategic projects like the Kaladan Multimodal Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway. (b) To fight India’s insurgency Junta support was necessary to destroy insurgents’ sanctuary inside Myanmar. (c) From the regional power outlook India did not want Myanmar to fall into the fold of China. So, even against the genocide and human catastrophe of Rohingya, India decided to stand by the side of Myanmar. However, the tide is turning against the Junta in Myanmar and a military defeat of TATMADAW is on the horizon. India recognized the existence of resistance groups and for the very first time has invited NUG, AA, KIA, and Chin National Forest to a seminar titled “Constitutionalism and Federation” in New Delhi on September 24, 2024.

ASEAN Factor:

ASEAN’s initiative to deal with the Rohingya crisis was not very remarkable. Despite individual member states like Malaysia’s pro-activeness could not make any headway primarily considering it was of jurisdiction matter of ASEAN. However, after the coup in 2021, ASEAN states were vocal and wanted to bring an end to the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar that encompassed the Rohingya issue as well. It proposed a ‘Five-Point Consensus for Peace’ two years back but remains unimplemented due to the non-cooperation of the Junta. On October 9, 2024, at ‘Summit’ in Laos, Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra proposed an informal consultation’ in December to find a solution for Myanmar. For the first time in three years, Myanmar sent a senior foreign ministry official to the talk. This is a positive sign considered by ASEAN.

Bangladesh Factor and My Take:

Bangladesh’s foreign policy seems very conservative and does not allow complaining even if a wrong has been done to it. Its Gambia went to ICJ for Rohingyas, not Bangladesh. The ICJ hearing was from 10-12 December; 2019 at The Hague where Gambia a small country in West Africa (with a population of 2.7 million and per capita income of $ 707) took Myanmar to ICJ, sadly during the same time frame (11-14 December; 2019) Bangladesh Army Chief was visiting Myanmar, possibly to exhibit that Bangladesh has no issue with Myanmar and Rohingya issue is Myanmar’s internal issue. Even Bangladesh does not officially address the Rohingya people as Rohingya’. It is termed as FDMN (Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals). Because Myanmar does not want them to be called Rohingya. Does Bangladesh have an independent policy/strategy about Rohingya Repatriation? If there is any that has not been surfaced in the public domain. Dhaka always relied on regional powers; India and China and the international community. They have their agendas and national interests that may not tally with ours. The international community would express sympathy, provide humanitarian assistance but risking geopolitical interest is altogether a different matter. We cannot blame them for their strategy on Rohingya Repatriation if we do not have one. Rohingya Repatriation was not a national priority in Bangladesh. It is not our ‘Centre of Gravity’. Hasina Regime’s number one priority (especially after the 2014 election) was to establish its legitimacy by employing Bangladesh missions abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and government machinery (in such an environment regime’s interest is greater than country’s interest). The Rohingya issue was not an existential threat to the regime. Dhaka did not negotiate with AA even after the coup of 2021 in Myanmar. AA Chief, Major General Twan Mrat Naing in 2022 in an interview with a Bangladeshi-born British journalist expressed his full sympathy for Rohingyas and was desirous to take back them in Rakhine as part and parcel of Myanmar in general and Rakhine in particular. In exchange, he expected sympathy for Rakhine people and humanitarian support from Bangladesh. Of course, Dhaka did not pay attention. Now, he terms Rohingyas as Bengali Muslims and repatriation is not on his agenda. Interestingly, now some of the Rakhine journalists are calling Rohingyas as Chittagonians. A dominant group in Rakhine polity would like to discuss all kinds of harmonious development agenda with Bangladesh except Rohingya Repatriation issue. Seems opportunities slipped away. The Junta is no more a legitimate government of Myanmar nor does it control the majority administration of Myanmar. Rohingyas after repatriation will go back to Rakhine and now Rakhine is mostly under the control of AA. In reality, AA runs judiciary, police, and civil administration in almost all of Rakhine except the military-occupied state capital and a few towns. However, Dhaka continues communication with Junta only. On the contrary, all the neighbors are now engaging with EAOs and their political parties besides the Junta. This is pragmatism. Very recently, the UN has warned about the upcoming famine in Rakhine. Agriculture production has declined and combined with the near halt of trade two million out of three million people are at risk of starvation. 60% population is displaced and more than half a million are now entirely on aid. However, TATMADAW’s ‘Four Cut Strategy’ in Rakhine (restriction on food, medicine, and intra, interstate movement) has turned this humanitarian issue into a crisis. The recent violence has taken a new turn in Rakhine. So long since the military has been accused of persecution of Rohingyas, now, AA has been accused of targeting them. This triggered a new wave of refugees fleeing into Bangladesh. TATMADAW persecution forced Rohingya exodus in bulk but they did not deny the allegation of expulsion. On the other hand, now AA causing atrocities against Rohingyas and expulsion is taking place in small groups but AA denying their involvement.

NUG’s position now taking Rohingyas back with equality and dignity once the situation is stable and democratic force in power in Myanmar and absorbing them in their society. NUG also expressed its intention to bring perpetrators of Rohingya human rights violations and genocide to justice. However, Dhaka is not meaningfully engaging NUG as well. In a seminar in Dhaka last year, the Foreign Minister of NUG joined online and expressed her frustration of not being able to engage Dhaka. Possibly Interim Government with so much of things going around will overlook engagement with NUG thereby missing the opportunity again. Likely Rohingya Repatriation is not on their radar now, neither it’s their priority, inevitably nor in the interest of Rakhine/AA. This only highlights the grim reality of Rohingya Repatriation.

We need to remember if the pains and sorrows of neighbors do not touch us, in their happiness and joy they are also not going to remember us and our concerns as well.