Securing Critical Undersea Infrastructure in the Bay of Bengal

Dependence, Exposure and Regional Resilience from a Bangladesh Perspective

Dependence, Exposure and Regional Resilience from a Bangladesh Perspective

Abstract

Critical undersea infrastructure (CUI), especially Submarine cables and offshore energy facilities are crucial to global connectivity and energy security. Increasing dependence on such critical infrastructure in the Bay exposes Bangladesh to great risks due to disruption, inadequate redundancy and limited restoration capacity. This study explores Bangladesh’s dependence on CUI, its weaknesses, restoration capacitiesvis-à-vis existing governance organizations to identify practical measures to strengthen resilience. This paper delved into scholarly literature, policy documents, legislation, official records, industry data and media reports and adopted a qualitative single-case study approach. The findings found that international submarine connectivity of Bangladesh relies exclusively on two state-owned cables with a capacity of approximately 7.2 Tbps, against national demand of around 13.5 Tbps, while approximately 29% of its gas supply depends on two offshore floating terminals. The SEA-ME-WE 5 cable disruption of prolong 69 days duration in 2024 highlighted critical vulnerabilities, specifically dependence on foreign repair-vessels and associated regulatory authorizations. Fragmented national governance and insufficient regional cooperation further weaken resilience. This paper argues that concentration of infrastructure and late restoration pose greater risks than intentional assaults alone. The study suggests cost-effective national reforms and five regional cooperation approaches, using present institutional frameworks, to reinforce CUI security and resilience in the Bay of Bengal.

Keywords: Critical Undersea Infrastructure; Bangladesh; Bay of Bengal; Submarine Cables; Maritime Security; Infrastructure Resilience; Regional Cooperation.

1. Introduction

1.1 What Undersea Infrastructure is, and Why it Matters

Critical undersea infrastructure includes set of installations on or underneath the sea bottom,the disruption of which would adversely affect the economy, security or public services of the state. It comprises four different categories (Table 1). The submarine fibre-optic telecommunications cables, which are most significant carry the internet, financial messaging, cloud services and much government traffic between countries [1,2]. The modern cables are mostly about the width of a garden hose. The glass fibres are located at its core with the thickness of a human hair, protected by a copper conductor that powers the steel strength members, repeaters and a polyethylene sheath having extra armour in shallow water [1,2]. Repeaters amplify the light pulses travelling along the fibres at intervals along the route, and branching units permit one trunk to serve several nations (Figure 1). A landing station, where the cable touches shore connects it to the national network; it is frequently the most visible spot in the system [3].

Figure 1. Main elements of critical undersea infrastructure, from the landing station to the deep seabed, with a simplified cable cross-section. Schematic, not to scale. Sources: compiled by the author from Carter et al. [1], TeleGeography [2] and ENISA [3].

Figure 1. Key sections of critical undersea infrastructure, from the landing station to the deep-sea bottom, with a simplified cable cross-section. Schematic, not to scale. Sources: compiled by the author from Carter et al. [1], Tele Geography [2] and ENISA [3].

Table 1. Main Types of Critical Undersea Infrastructure

Type

Function

Examples relevant to Bangladesh

Telecommunications cables and landing stations

International data, voice and internet traffic

SEA-ME-WE 4 (Cox’s Bazar), SEA-ME-WE 5 (Kuakata), SEA-ME-WE 6 (planned)

Energy pipelines and moorings

Import or transport of oil and gas

Single point mooring and undersea pipeline off Moheshkhali (since 2023)

Floating terminals and their subsea connections

LNG regasification and delivery to shore

Two FSRUs off Moheshkhali

Power cables and other seabed assets

Electricity interconnection, offshore energy, ocean sensing

None in service; potential future offshore energy and research assets

Sources: author’s classification, drawing on Carter et al. [1] and ENISA [3]; Bangladesh examples from the sources cited in Section 2.

The magnitude of dependency on submarine cables globally is enormous and is on the rise. As per TeleGeography there are more than 600 active and planned cable systems and over 1.5 million kilometres of cable in service [2]; the Internet Society tracks about 570 cables in service in 2025, with 81 more planned, carrying 97–98% of intercontinental internet traffic [4]. Satellites cannot be a scalable alternative. The regulator in the US places their portion of US international capacity at 0.37% [2]. Cables fail quite frequently, at a rate of about 150 to 200 faults a year globally attributable commonly to fishing gear and ships’ anchors [2,3]. The presence of a cable is felt instantly by the entire economy only when it fails [5,6].

1.2 The Bay of Bengal as a Corridor and a Commons

The Bay of Bengal forms a bridge between South and South-East Asia and lies on the mouth of the Strait of Malacca, through which 25% of the world’s maritime commerce crosses [7]. It is a “strategic hinge” between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific [8]. What lies hidden underneath these waters matter just as much. The SEA-ME-WE (South-East Asia–Middle East–Western Europe) cable systems that provides vital service to Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka pass through the Strait of Malacca to Singapore. Sri Lanka has turned into a cable hub, with the landing of India–Asia–Xpress at Matara in 2023 and SEA-ME-WE 6 landing there in December 2024 [9,10]. India connected Chennai with the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in 2020 by a 2,313 km cable [11,12]. The locations and the major systems that are discussed in this article are shown in figure 2.

Figure 2. Principal undersea infrastructure in the Bay of Bengal discussed in this article. Cable routes are indicative only. Base map: Natural Earth (public domain). Landing and event data: sources cited in Sections 1.2 and 4.

Figure 2. The principal submarine infrastructure in the Bay of Bengal discussed in this article. Cable routes are indicative only. Base map: Natural Earth (public domain). Landing and event data: sources cited in Sections 1.2 and 2.

The Bay of Bengal presents a challenging physical environment. The Bay represents some of the most engaged coastal fishing grounds in Asia, congested and overcrowded anchorages off Chattogram, Mongla and Payra, an annual tropical storm season, and the Swatch of No Ground, a deep submarine canyon located at the edge of Bangladesh’s shelf that feeds sediment flows into the Bengal Fan [13,14]. Bangladesh has settled its maritime boundaries through international adjudication with Myanmar in 2012 and India in 2014 [15,16].

1.3 Problem, Aim and Research Questions

Since 2023, a series of incidents from the Baltic to the Taiwan Strait and off Western Australia, has shifted the submarine infrastructure from a purely technical subject to a matter of national security issue [17,18]. Though there is no confirmed intentional attack in the Bay of Bengal yet, its littoral states is dependent on a small number of foreign ships for repair of their systems. The Sixth Bay of Bengal Maritime Dialogue (Colombo, 3–4 November 2026) earmarked a session dealing with the subject and asked participants to identify emerging norms, critical information gaps, lessons from other regions and concrete measures [7].

This article attempts to address those questions from the perspective of Bangladesh. The aim is to assess the resilience of the submarine infrastructure which is vital for Bangladesh and propose practical measures.

There are four research questions:

•             RQ1. How dependent is Bangladesh on submarine infrastructure in the Bay?

•             RQ2. How vulnerable is that infrastructure to accidental, natural and deliberate harm?

•             RQ3. How quickly can it be restored when it fails, and what are the limitations?

•             RQ4. How well prepared are national, regional and international governance arrangements to provide security, and what should change?

2. Key Findings and Strategic Analysis

2.1 Dependence: A Large Economy on Two Cables

Bangladesh’s international connectivity has been developed in three stages of the SEA-ME-WE system, all owned and operated by the state-owned Bangladesh Submarine Cable PLC (BSCPLC) (Table 2). SEA-ME-WE 4 landed at Cox’s Bazar in 2006 and SEA-ME-WE 5 at Kuakata in 2017. In September 2026 BSCPLC reported total capacity of about 7,200 Gbps, of which about 4,000 Gbps was in use [36]. Experts cited by Financial Express put the capacity of the two systems at about 4.6 Tbps and 2.5 Tbps respectively and expect SEA-ME-WE 4 to reach the end of its operational life around 2030 [37].

Table 2. Undersea Infrastructure on Which Bangladesh Depends

Asset

Landing or location

In service

Role and status

SEA-ME-WE 4

Cox’s Bazar

2006

About 4.6 Tbps; end of design life expected around 2030

SEA-ME-WE 5

Kuakata

2017

About 2.5 Tbps; out of service 20 April–28 June 2024

SEA-ME-WE 6

Cox’s Bazar (planned)

Expected 2027

Would raise state capacity to about 34 Tbps

Bangladesh Private Cable System (BPCS)

Planned

Stalled

Design 3 fibre pairs of at least 15 Tbps; vessel clearance withheld in August 2026

Single point mooring and twin pipelines

Off Moheshkhali

July 2023

Crude oil and diesel imports to Chattogram

Two FSRUs and subsea gas connections

Off Moheshkhali

Since 2018

All imported LNG; about 29% of gas supply in FY2024–25

Sources: [14,36–40]. FSRU, floating storage and regasification unit. The FSRU share is the author’s calculation from the figures in [14].

Growth in demand has significantly outpaced our existing submarine cable infrastructure. National bandwidth use rose from about 50 Gbps in 2013 to about 13.5 Tbps in 2026 [37], and Bangladesh had 135.95 million internet subscriptions at the end of June 2026 [41]. International Terrestrial Cable (ITC) operators importing bandwidth over land from India fills the gap between the 7.2 Tbps of submarine capacity and the 13.5 Tbps used. About 60% of Bangladesh’s bandwidth was being received this way, but in February 2025, the regulator limited Indian imports at 50% [42]. BSCPLC doubts that a crisis is imminent, pointing to unused capacity and to SEA-ME-WE 6 [36]. The independent forecasts, however, are quite high: about 19.1 Tbps in 2027, 27 Tbps in 2028 and 54 Tbps in 2030 [37]. The regulator’s own projection of about 30 Tbps by 2030 [36] is lower, but still close to the 34 Tbps that state capacity would reach with SEA-ME-WE 6 (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Bangladesh’s international bandwidth: current supply and projected demand. State capacity and use from BSCPLC; national use and projections from experts quoted by the Financial Express; regulator projection from BSCPLC. Sources: [36,37].

Figure 3. Bangladesh’s international bandwidth: current supply and projected demand. State capacity and use from BSCPLC; national use and projections from experts quoted by Financial Express; regulator projection from BSCPLC. Sources: [36,37].

This becomes clearer with two additional facts. The third cable has stumbled: reports in 2025 expected SEA-ME-WE 6 to reach Bangladesh by the end of 2026 [43], but BSCPLC now expects it in 2027 [36]. Private sector led diversification has not yet been achieved. Bangladesh Private Cable System (BPCS), designed as three fibre pairs of at least 15 Tbps each, submitted application for vessel clearance on 31 March 2026 [38]; clearance was suspended in August, after about US$53 million had been spent [39]. It’s important to note that the cable can be laid only during the November to mid-May weather window [44]. The government announced in September 2026 that it would open the submarine cable market to private investors [45]. Regionally, Bangladesh is an outlier: experts count 19 international cables landing in India, 23 in Malaysia, 19 in the Philippines, 12 in Thailand and 10 in Sri Lanka, against barely two in Bangladesh [37].

The energy sector is also subject to this dependence. The single point mooring off Moheshkhali, Bangladesh’s first undersea pipeline, entered service in July 2023 [40]. All imported LNG arrives in Bangladesh through two Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs) moored in the same area. In FY2024–25 the country imported 7.98 billion cubic metres of LNG against domestic production of 19.6 billion cubic metres [14], so the two FSRUs supplied about 29% of total gas (author’s calculation). A recent studydepicts these installations and the associated pipelines as “a major point of vulnerability” and predicts LNG’s share to grow towards half of supply by 2028 [27].

It is worth noting that the data demonstrates three distinct forms of concentration. The first is physical: two cables and two landing stations handle the total volume of Bangladesh’s submarine traffic, and two floating terminals in one anchorage carry entirequantity of its LNG. The second is institutional: one state-owned company owns all submarine capacity. The third is geographic: the balance of internet traffic arrives through a single neighbour. The Indian links are a real asset, as April 2024 showed, but they are a substitute route rather than additional undersea resilience.

2.2 Exposure: Ordinary Hazards, Rising Strategic Attention

Accidental and Natural Causes. Human activity triggers most of the faults at sea worldwide and not by sabotage. Compiled data by European Union Agency for Cyber security (ENISA)from International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC)indicates that approximately 40% of all faults in a recent dataset originated from anchoring and fishing alone, and 87% are reported due to all kinds of human intervention. (Figure 4) [3]. TeleGeography features that about two-thirds of faults are due to fishing and anchoring alone [2], and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)places the figure at about 80% [46]. The differences reflect datasets and the share of faults with no recorded cause; the direction is the same in all three.

Figure 5. Causes of submarine cable faults, as a share of recorded faults. Data: ENISA analysis of ICPC fault data, 2023; “other human” derived by the author as the difference between total human intervention and anchoring and fishing. Source: [3].

Figure 4. Causes of submarine cable faults, as a share of recorded faults. Data: ENISA analysis of ICPC fault data, 2023; “other human” derived by the author as the difference between total human intervention and anchoring and fishing. Source: [3].

The Bay faces challenging conditions due to these hazards regularly. Its coastal waters are overcrowded with small-boat fishing, and its approaches to Chattogram, Mongla and Payra are congested with ships at anchor [27]. Tropical storms strike the energy terminals directly: during Cyclone Mocha in May 2023 both FSRUs got disconnected, and after Cyclone Remal in May 2024 regasification got reduced from about 1,100 to about 600 million cubic feet a day for almost four months [14]. Due to a technical glitch that occurred in July 2026about 450 million cubic feet a day were removed, roughly half of LNG supply [14]. The Canyon Channels in the Swatch of No Ground transports sediment into the Bengal Fan [13]. Although no cable failure is attributed to it so far, the turbidity currents that broke multiple cables off Taiwan and elsewhere [1] make it a point worthtaking into cognizance when routing future cables.

Deliberate Interference. There has been no confirmed report of any deliberate attack on undersea infrastructure in the Bay of Bengal yet. The international situation has, however, experienced abrupt change (Figure 5). Since 2023, cables have been severed near Taiwan’s Matsu islands [47], in the Red Sea by the anchor of a damaged ship [48], and in the Baltic, where the tanker Eagle S damaged the Estlink 2 power cable and four telecommunications cables on 25 December 2024 [23]. This has affected Bangladesh directly: SEA-ME-WE 4 was among the cables severed in the Red Sea in September 2025 [49]. In 2026 two cables failed off Perth inside a cable protection zone, with an unidentified vessel recorded nearby and an assessment by the Australian Federal Police that reached no conclusion [50,51]; the Australia–Singapore Cable was cut inside Indonesian waters in September [52]; and the City-to-City (C2C) system between the Philippines and Singapore failed in early October, the cause undetermined [53].

 

Figure 6. Selected incidents affecting undersea infrastructure, 2023–2026. Events that affected Bangladesh directly are in bold. Sources: [14,23,24,35,47–50,52,53].

Figure 5. Selected incidents affecting undersea infrastructure, 2023–2026. Events that affected Bangladesh directly are in bold. Sources: [14,23,24,35,47–50,52,53].

Geopolitical and strategic interests in the seabed of the Bay continue to expand. There are reports that Chinese research and survey vessels are operating in and near the Bay, including near the Investigator Ridge [8], and a Chinese research vessel was reported to have sailed for 16 days in July 2025 with its Automatic Identification System (AIS) switched off [54]. There are indications that fibre links to island bases could also carry undersea sensors, although this remains speculative [26]. Survey activity is lawful in many circumstances, and none of these reports shows hostile intent; but survey data on bathymetry and seabed conditions are dual-use, and they reveal where cables lie.

However, for Bangladesh the likelihood of damage would be predominantly by the ordinary: fishing gear, anchors, tropical storms and faults on distant parts of systems it does not have control over. Both cable disruptions that Bangladesh has faced since 2023 happened at a far distance from the Bay, in the Strait of Malacca and the Red Sea. The deliberate threat is real but, in current evidence, a question of preparedness rather than of an observed pattern in the Bay.

2.3 Recovery Capacity: the April 2024 Case

The obvious proof about Bangladesh’s resilience arises from the failure of SEA-ME-WE 5 in 2024. A fault occurred on 20thof April in Indonesian waters of the Strait of Malacca, which is about 440 km from Singapore, and consequently Bangladesh lost about 1.7 Tbps, approximately a third of its international bandwidth at the time [35]. As per the initial estimation of BSCPLC’sthe repairs would take “a minimum of two to three days” [35]. The service was however restored on 28th of June, 69days later [55]. The main reason was not technical. The delay was principally attributable to Indonesian cabotage rules that required the deployment of a locally flagged repair vessel and permits [56]. The cause of the fault was never publicly confirmed and nobody attacked that cable [57].

The outage did not lead to a full-blown national shutdown. Internet Society calculations indicated that much of the traffic was absorbed by Indian terrestrial links and about 69% of the most popular websites were served from caches inside Bangladesh [34]. These are valuable lessons learnt: terrestrial links and local content were found to be the most effective forms of resilience available.

The 2024 case reveals a structural limitation rather than a single catastrophe. As per the assessment of ENISA there exist only about 30 cable maintenance vessels and 35 installation vessels globally, and accounts for 185 repairs across 44 jurisdictions in 2021 [3]. None is based in Bangladesh, and we are not alone. India, the largest user of this Bay, has no Indian-flagged cable repair ship. Its repair depends on vessels based in Singapore and Dubai. Repairs in Indian waters usually take four to five months; India plans a single window permit portal by March 2027 [58]. The Australia–Singapore Cable repair in 2026 was again slowed due to permits, cabotage rules and approvals from navy [52]. The conclusion arrived at the International Cable Protection Committee-Centre for International Law (ICPC–CIL) workshop suggests that governments should assign a single point of contact for cable related issues and pre-authorise repair components so that repair activities are not delayed pending necessary permission [30].

In each recent case the duration of an outage was less attributable to the damage than to permits and decisions, flags and the availability of cable repair ships. Repair is the region’s weak link. For Bangladesh, whose submarine cables cross several territories before they reach Singapore, recovery depends on the rules of states it does not have any control over. This is the central finding of the study.

2.4 Governance: National Arrangements

Law. Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act of Bangladesh was updated in 2021andcomprises communication cables and oil pipelines among protected “installations” and sets penalties of minimum three years’ imprisonment and fines ranging from Tk 5 to10 crore [59]. Its section on cables, however, follows United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 113 referring cables “beneath the High Seas” [22,59]. Whether it reaches damage by a foreign ship within Bangladesh’s territorial sea or exclusive economic zone is not specified. The Finnish Eagle S case demonstrates why is this important: a district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in October 2025, and an appeal court reversed that decision in August 2026 [23,60]. Taiwan, conversely, sentenced the captain of the Hong Tai 58 under domestic law in June 2025 [24]. The older 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables lacks broad ratification and proposes little additional cover [30,61]. The Cyber Security Ordinance of 2025 deals with fibre-optic networks but not the undersea physical terrain [62]. The Coast Guard Act of 2016 entitles coastal law enforcement its powers. Our Indo-Pacific Outlook, announced in April 2023, commits Bangladesh to the Law of Sea Convention, to freedom of navigation and overflight, and to strengthening existing mechanisms for maritime safety and security. Protection of submarine cables falls squarely within those commitments.

Institutions.Division of responsibility. The Ministry of Posts Telecommunications and Information Technology and the regulator responsible for issuing license and regulatingsubmarine cables; BSCPLC owns and maintains them; the Navy and the Coast Guard, under the Coast Guard Act 2016, police the sea [27,63].The Australian National University (ANU) studyfound no central body to coordinate maritime domain awareness, no unified and comprehensive national oceans policy or a formal standalone maritime security strategy, and no coastal radar coverage outside Chattogram region, and a Coast Guard that is under-resourced compared to the task it is expected to perform [27]. Under Operation Blue Guard the Navy keeps a ship and a contingent deployed continuously, escorts LNG carriers and supports cable laying, and cable security as part of its responsibility [27]. From March 2026, the Navy in coordination with the Coast Guard increased patrols to protect fuel vessels, the ports, energy installations and undersea infrastructures [64]. The head of Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development (BIMRAD), a maritime research institute, has proposed a National Maritime Security Council to bring all the fragmented institutions and agencies under one umbrella for better coordination [28].

Some recent steps have strengthened the capability of the foundations. Bangladesh agreed to acquire the former Royal Navy survey vessel HMS Enterprise in February 2026 [65], which will improve hydrographic capacity, and it chairs the North Indian Ocean Hydrographic Commission for 2025–2027 [66]. Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific Outlook of 2023 commits it to maritime cooperation but not specific regarding undersea infrastructure, although those commitments encompass submarine cable protection [67].

Table 3 Summarizes the national gaps.

Table 3. National Governance of Undersea Infrastructure in Bangladesh: Provisions and Gaps

Function

Current provision

Gap identified

Legal protection

Maritime Zones Act 2021; penalties of at least 3 years and Tk 5–10 crore

Reach over foreign ships in territorial sea and EEZ not explicit; no cable protection zones

Strategy and coordination

Indo-Pacific Outlook 2023; proposed National Maritime Security Council

No maritime security strategy; no lead body for undersea infrastructure

Maritime domain awareness

Navy (Operation Blue Guard) and Coast Guard; radar around Chattogram

No central fusion of the maritime picture; limited coverage beyond Chattogram

Charting and data

Navy hydrographic service; survey vessel acquired 2026

Cable and pipeline routes not consistently shown on charts available to fishers

Repair and permits

Ad hoc clearances

No single point of contact; no pre-agreed regime for foreign repair ships

Operator–state relationship

BSCPLC (state-owned); regulator

No routine fault-data sharing with the Navy and Coast Guard

Sources: [27,28,30,59,63–65,67]. The charting and data-sharing gaps are the author’s assessment from these sources.

2.5 Governance: Regional and International Frameworks

The Bay has more instruments and building blocks than is generally presumed, but none yet deal with undersea infrastructure directly (Table 4). In July 2026,Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) security chiefs, meeting in New Delhi, endorsed guiding principles on the conduct of maritime law enforcement agencies at sea and guidelines for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief [68]; BIMSTEC’s agreement on maritime transport cooperation entered into force in May 2026 [69]. The Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), which Bangladesh joined as a full member on 20 November 2025, has a pillar on cybersecurity and the protection of critical infrastructure [70]. The Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region in Gurugram hosts liaison officers from partner states [71]. The North Indian Ocean Hydrographic Commission brings together the Bay’s littoral states [66]. The outcome of the Fifth Bay of Bengal Maritime Dialogue named undersea infrastructure an emerging threat [72]; and the report on specific outcome on the issueis yet to come from the recently concluded Sixth Dialogue [73].

Table 4. Selected Frameworks Relevant to Undersea Infrastructure in the Bay of Bengal

Framework

Level

Relevant Content

Status for Bangladesh

UNCLOS Articles 79, 112–115

Global

Freedom to lay cables; duty to criminalise damage; indemnity rules

Party; implemented in the 2021 Act

ITU–ICPC International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience

Global

Summits (Abuja 2025, Porto 2026); recommendations on repair and permits (2026)

Open to participation

New York Joint Statement on undersea cables (2024)

Plurilateral

Security and resilience principles

Not an endorser

ASEAN Guidelines on cable resilience (2019, enhanced 2026)

Regional

Single contact point; streamlined repair permits

Not a member; Myanmar and Thailand are

BIMSTEC maritime law enforcement principles (2026)

Bay of Bengal

Conduct of agencies at sea

Chair 2025-2027; no CUI content yet

Colombo Security Conclave

Indian Ocean

Critical infrastructure pillar

Member since 2025

Information Fusion Centre – IOR

Indian Ocean

Shared maritime picture

Partner arrangements possible

North Indian Ocean Hydrographic Commission

Bay of Bengal

Charting standards and cooperation

Chair 2025–2027

EU Cable Security Toolbox (2026)

Other region

Repair capacity; streamlined permits including territorial sea and EEZ

Model only

Sources: [22,31,66,68,70,71,74–77].

Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is progressing fast and in2019 approved the guidelines on cable resilience and augmented them in January 2026 to call for a single government contact point and streamlined permits to affect repair [77]. In 2024, the ITU and ICPC formed an International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience; it organized summits in Abuja and Porto in February 2025 and February 2026 respectively [74] followed by announcement of working-group recommendations in July 2026 [75]. In February 2025, the European Union (EU)approved an Action Plan on Cable Security [78], followed by setting up of a Submarine Cable Security Toolbox in January 2026 that prioritises strengthening repair capabilities and streamlining permitting procedures, including access to territorial waters and exclusive economic zones to conduct operations to carry out cable repair[31]. In January 2025,North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commenced Operation Baltic Sentry, a multi-domain security mission [79]. In May 2023, the Quad launched the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience [80]. The EU together with 16 other countries endorsed the New York Joint Statement in September 2024; Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka did not [76]. The ICPC–CILworkshop observed that Asia has no regional cable protection committee [30].

2.6 Summary of Results

Table 5 brings the four dimensions together. The ratings are the author’s qualitative judgement from the evidence above.

Table 5. Resilience Scorecard for Undersea Infrastructure Serving Bangladesh

Dimension

Rating

Principal evidence

Dependence

High (unfavourable)

Two state cables (7.2 Tbps) against 13.5 Tbps use; one landing site per cable; about 29% of gas through two FSRUs

Exposure

Moderate to high

Fishing, anchoring and cyclones; distant faults in Malacca and the Red Sea; rising survey activity; no confirmed attack in the Bay

Recovery capacity

Low

69-day outage in 2024; no regional repair ship; permits and cabotage dominate repair times

Governance

Low to moderate

Fragmented mandates; no lead body or strategy; legal reach unclear; regional bodies exist but lack CUI content

3. Systemic Risks and Governance Implications

3.1 Concentration, not Sabotage as the Primary Threat

Since 2022, literature has framed undersea infrastructure focusing mainly on hybrid threats and sabotage [17,18]. For a developing littoral state such as Bangladesh, this perspective addresses only one dimension of the broader risk landscape. Since 2023, every disruption that Bangladesh experienced originated from either an ordinary cause or an unknown one: a fault in the Malacca Strait, cuts in the Red Sea, and tropical storm damage to energy terminals. The fundamental factor that turned these incidents into national-level challenges was the concentration of critical infrastructure, marked by a limited number of cables, landing points, terminals and repair vessels.

This reinforces Liebetrau and Bueger’s argument that resilience, rather than protection alone, should serve as the guiding principle for policy [5], while aligning with ENISA’s emphasis on redundancy and repair capabilities [3].The policy implication is that Bangladesh’s most effective security investments are also those that strengthen its economic resilience. These include bringing third submarine cable into service, encouraging private and regional cable systems to install future landing sites away from the Cox’s Bazar-Moheshkhali cluster, and diversifying energy import facilities. Physical security remains equally important, as effective deterrence against interference requires the state to maintain adequate surveillance and awareness of its seabed. However, naval policing alone cannot address the vulnerabilities of an infrastructure network dependent on just two critical points of failure.

3.2 The Imperative of Repair Sovereignty

The outage that lasted 69days in 2024 underscores the significance of what may be labeled repair sovereignty - a state’s capability to ensure timely repair of its critical infrastructure without excessive dependence on the decisions or discretion of other states. Bangladesh’s submarine cables pass through the waters of many countries, implying that, in case of a failure, the pace of repair is often subject to the respective coastal states’ regulations concerning vessel flagging, permits and naval clearances, rather than Bangladesh’s operational requirements. This should not be viewed as criticism of Indonesia or any other state, as cabotage regulations serve legitimate national interests. Rather, it reflects a challenge of cross-border coordination that can be addressed through appropriate institutional mechanisms. ASEAN’s enhanced guidelines endorsed in January 2026 [77], the EU’sSubmarine Cable Security Toolbox [31] and the ICPC–CIL recommendations [30] broadly converge on three practical measures: establishing a single point of contact, introducing pre-approved repair protocols, and permitting emergency exemptions from cabotage requirements. With Myanmar and Thailand being members of ASEAN, a Bay of Bengal framework aligned with established ASEAN practices could build upon an existing regional model rather than inventing an entirely new mechanism.

3.3 Fragmentation and the Information Deficit

The second major structural vulnerability concerns information management and sharing. Data on cable faults are maintained by private operators, maritime activities are monitored by navies and coast guards, while seabed information is held by hydrographic authorities. However, these sources of information are seldom integrated. The absence of shared fault data makes it difficult to distinguish accidental damage from deliberate interference, as demonstrated by the Perth and C2C submarine cable incidents in 2026 [50,53]. Similarly, without properly charted cable routes, fishing communities cannot take adequate precautions to avoid damaging cables, while coast guards lack the necessary information to identify suspicious activities in their vicinity. In Bangladesh, a study conducted by the ANU found that no single agency consolidates the overall maritime picture [27]and available information is even not being utilised to its full potential. Nevertheless, information sharing offers a promising area for regional cooperation, as existing mechanisms such as the Colombo Security Conclave and the Information Fusion Centre provide an institutional foundation on which further collaboration can be developed [70,71].

3.4 Geopolitical Friction and the Case for Neutral Mechanisms

The Bay of Bengal is a domain of strategic rivalry [8,26]. Bangladesh’s interest is to secure its infrastructure without being drawn into competing blocs. It did not endorse the New York Joint Statement [76], and it engages itself in mechanisms supported by broader membership of the United Nations. This implies that the most appropriate arrangements for Bangladesh, and possibly for several of its neighbours, are those that are functional, inclusive and anchored in existing regional bodies, rather than those associated with any one power or endorsed by select group of nations. Bangladesh’s own record supports such an approach: it settled both of its maritime boundaries through international adjudication [15,16], demonstrating a preference for rules-based results that can function as a foundation for practical cooperation on the seabed.

3.5 Comparative Lessons from Other Regions

Three valuable lessons arise from these comparative experiences. First, while the establishment of protection zones is essential, it cannot ensure the security of undersea infrastructure on its own. The cable faults recorded off Perth in 2026 occurred within an existing protection zone [50], highlighting the need to complement such zones with effective surveillance, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Second, domestic legal frameworks must clearly define the jurisdiction and legal authority of coastal states over foreign vessels operating within their maritime zones. The Finnish courts took nearly two years to resolve the jurisdictional questions arising from the Eagle S case [60], while Taiwan was able to pursue prosecution under a clearly established domestic legal framework [24]. Third, cooperation to facilitate the timely repair of damaged cables offers one of the most immediate and cost-effective approaches to strengthening infrastructure resilience. This is reflected in the emphasis placed on repair arrangements and operational coordination by both the EU Submarine Cable Security Toolbox and ASEAN guidelines [31,77]. Finally, the Baltic experience underscores the limitations of relying solely on naval responses. Although Operation Baltic Sentry strengthened maritime surveillance [79], it did not, in itself, address the underlying legal uncertainties exposed by the Eagle S case.

4. Recommendations

The recommendations are drawn from the study’s findings and designed to be practical and achievable. They are dependent on present institutional frameworks, require no new treaty arrangements and involve relatively modest costs. Organised into distinct layers (Figure 6), they are summarised in Table 6, alongside the proposed lead institutions and implementation timeframes.

Figure 7. Layered framework of recommended measures, from the international to the national level. Source: author.

Figure 6. Layered framework of recommended measures, from the international to the national level. Source: Author.

National Measures (Bangladesh)

1.          Designate a lead and a strategy. Establish the National Maritime Security Council that BIMRAD has proposed [28], with an explicit mandate for undersea infrastructure, and publish a maritime security strategy that includes it.

2.          Build one maritime picture. Link the Navy, the Coast Guard, the regulator and BSCPLC through a single maritime domain awareness arrangement, so that cable faults, AIS data and patrol reports are seen together [27].

3.          Clarify the law. Review the Maritime Zones Act 2021 so that offences against cables and pipelines clearly apply to foreign ships in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone, and provide for declared protection zones off Cox’s Bazar, Kuakata and Moheshkhali, with anchoring and trawling restrictions [25,30,59].

4.          Diversify routes and landings. Deliver SEA-ME-WE 6 without further delay, resolve the clearance of private cables, and encourage at least one new landing site away from existing ones [36,39,45].

5.          Harden energy terminals. Treat the Moheshkhali FSRUs and pipelines as critical infrastructure, with dedicated patrols, weather contingency plans and additional import capacity [14,27].

6.          Strengthen the Coast Guard. Expand its offshore patrol capacity and coastal radar coverage beyond Chattogram covering the whole coast [27].

Regional Measures (Bay of Bengal)

7.          A 24/7 contact list. Within one year, each Bay state names a single point of contact for cable incidents and repair permits; BIMSTEC holds and tests the list [30,77].

8.          A green channel for repair. Accredited repair ships enter on notification, with pre-agreed emergency exemptions from cabotage rules, through an annex to the BIMSTEC maritime law enforcement principles [31,68].

9.          A common fault notice. A standard format for reporting faults and incidents, shared within hours through the Colombo Security Conclave and the Information Fusion Centre [70,71].

10.      Charted cable corridors. Coordinated through the North Indian Ocean Hydrographic Commission, with an awareness program telling fishers where cables lie and that UNCLOS Article 115 entitles them to compensation when they sacrifice gear to avoid damaging a cable [22,66].

11.      A Bay of Bengal cable protection forum. Governments, navies, coast guards, owners and repairers meet regularly, filling the absence of a regional committee in Asia, with a first table-top exercise in 2027 [30].

International Engagement. Bangladesh should take part actively in the ITU–ICPC Advisory Body [74,75] and align regional arrangements with the ASEAN guidelines [77], so that the Bay’s practice is compatible with its neighbors’.

Table 6. Recommended Measures, Lead Bodies and Timeframes

No.

Measure

Lead

Timeframe

1

National Maritime Security Council and strategy

Government; Armed Forces Division

1–2 years

2

One maritime picture

Navy, with Coast Guard, regulator and BSCPLC

1–2 years

3

Legal review and protection zones

Ministries of Law, Foreign Affairs and Posts and Telecommunications

1–3 years

4

Route and landing diversity

Posts and Telecommunications Division; regulator; BSCPLC

1–5 years

5

Hardened energy terminals

Energy and Mineral Resources Division; Navy

1–3 years

6

Coast Guard capacity

Ministry of Home Affairs; Coast Guard

2–5 years

7

24/7 contact list

BIMSTEC; all member states

Within 1 year

8

Repair green channel

BIMSTEC; maritime and telecom authorities

1–3 years

9

Common fault notice

Colombo Security Conclave; IFC-IOR; operators

1–2 years

10

Charted corridors and fisher awareness

NIOHC; national hydrographic offices; fisheries departments

1–3 years

11

Cable protection forum and exercise

Littoral states with industry

First exercise in 2027

Source: Author. Lead bodies are indicative and subject to national decisions.

Progress can be measured simply: whether the contact list exists and has been tested, whether the first exercise has been held, and whether the first corridor has been charted.

5. Conclusion

The digital economy and the increasing energy supply of Bangladeshdepend heavily on a restricted inventory of submarine infrastructure assets extending across the Bay of Bengaland its broader maritime boundaries. The findings of this study suggest that the most significant threat to these assets, based on currently available evidence, is not necessarily deliberate sabotage, but rather the combination of infrastructure concentration and delays in repair. This vulnerability is reflected in the country’s dependence on two submarine cables, two energy terminals, and foreign vessels and regulatory approvals for repair operations. The 69-day disruption in April 2024 demonstrated how an otherwise routine technical failure can escalate into a national-level crisis when such vulnerabilities coincide.

Addressing these challenges is both feasible and within Bangladesh’s reach. At the national level, priorities should include designating a lead agency for maritime security coordination, establishing an integrated maritime domain awareness system, strengthening the relevant legal framework, and accelerating the diversification of submarine cables and energy terminals. At the regional level, practical cooperation could be advanced through a designated contact network, expedited procedures for emergency repairs, a common fault-notification mechanism, officially charted cable corridors, and a dedicated forum for cable protection. These initiatives could be developed through existing regional and institutional platforms, including BIMSTEC, the Colombo Security Conclave, the Information Fusion Centre and the North Indian Ocean Hydrographic Commission. Such measures would not necessarily require a new treaty or substantial financial commitments. Rather, their success would depend primarily on political commitment, clearly designated institutional responsibilities and agreed implementation timelines. By pursuing these measures collectively, the littoral states of the Bay of Bengal could translate the protection of critical undersea infrastructure from policy aspiration into effective regional practice.

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